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THABO MBEKI AS AFRICAN PANTHEON:  




This paper is inspired by the joint vision of the Vice Chancellor 
of the Universities of the West Indies, Professor Sir Hilary Beckles, and 
former Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the University of Johannesburg, 
Prof Ihron Rensburg, who challenged some of us in, 2016 and 2017, to 
brave, re-appraise and contest some of the Pan-African epistemologies, and 
go beyond old fashioned ideas of Africa and the Diaspora, review the con-
cepts of epistemological ruptures in Pan-African and global contexts, and 
begin to re-interrogate and re-engage the ideas of Pan-Africanism in order 
to re-imagine Global Africa. 
There is need for self-examination as Africans and people of African 
descent. We come at the idea of a Global Africa re-engaged and re-imagi-
ned through the works and views of Thabo Mbeki, South Africa’s second 
democratically elected president, and arguably the most influential global 
Pan-African leader of his time, the man who Adekeye Adebajo depicted as 
Africa’s “Philosopher King” (Sunday Independent 2016). Called a ruthless 
Machiavellian by some, an AIDS-denialist by others, and thin-skinned by 
more others (Adebajo 2016), he was, no doubt, and continues to be, a glo-
bal Pan-Africanist who pursued, and continues to pursue, a global African 
Renaissance vision.
On his continued pursuit of global Pan-Africanism, we could men-
tion his highly publicized work and report on illicit financial flows from 
Africa, due to a mercantilist relationship between global multinationals and 
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some African leaders. This incessant exploitation of Africa’s resources obs-
tructs the realization of the African Renaissance vision and of full indepen-
dence, and renders the continent bound to external actors devoid of Africa’s 
best interests at heart.
Mbeki: a Global African Thought leader
Mbeki was not just a foreign policy president, but also a global African 
thought leader. His presence in the diplomatic and political arenas always 
loomed large,and his international role and grand foreign policy agenda is 
legendary. On 8 June 2000, just one year into Mbeki’s term as president, for-
mer President Mandela put Mbeki on the proverbial global pedestal. Mandela 
concluded, while referring to Mbeki’s exploits in the realm of international 
affairs, “I do not think there is anyone in the history who has put South Africa 
on the map as has President Mbeki” (News Africa 2000). In December 2002, 
Mandela continued with this narrative of Mbeki’s formidable foreign policy 
and diplomatic skills when he again said, “no president or prime minister 
in the world could boast of having done more than Thabo [Mbeki]” (News24 
2017).  Although Mbeki’s statesmanship could not be honestly contested, 
recognition for him as an exceptional statesman also came from the highest 
quarters.   
The man that many described as aloof and distanced from the mas-
ses was all about work-ethic and putting Africa at the apex of his political 
life. In the words of Barney Afako (2016, xiv); “Mbeki’s is about hard work…
and Mbeki has always been about Africa”, Former OAU Secretary-General 
Salim Ahmed Salim echoed these sentiments when he opined that Mbeki 
was “one of the most outstanding emissaries of Africa in dealing with African 
problems” (cited in Afako, 2016, xiv). While he was deputy president of the 
Republic of South Africa from 1994 to 1999, as well as during his presidency 
between 1999 and 2008, and even after he left the stage of formal presidential 
politics in 2008, his role in national and international affairs was palpable, 
and he remains an intellectual and a thought leader to date. One of Mbeki’s 
fiercest critics, Adekeye Adebajo, who at one point likened Mbeki to a thin
-skinned autocrat, felt the need to remind us that, “Mbeki remains the most 
important political figure of his generation. As the leader of Africa’s most 
industrialized state and with a sweeping vision of an African Renaissance”, 
continued Adebajo, “Mbeki effectively ran the country as a de facto prime 
minister under Nelson Mandela after 1994” (Business Day 2016). During a 
speech in November 2012, Mbeki’s friend-turned-foe, President Jacob Zuma, 
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sung Mbeki’s praises stating that, “former president Thabo Mbeki was able 
to create macro-economic stability and bring in economic protection for the 
country’s people” (EWNr 2012). Said Zuma, “comrade Mbeki succeeded to do 
something that many found very difficult to do – to draft for president Tambo. 
He was a very difficult leader to draft for and only Mbeki succeeded” (EWN 
2012).  What Zuma was referring to was Mbeki’s role as the speech-writer 
for former ANC president Oliver Tambo. It should also be noted that he was 
the speech-writer for former president Nelson Mandela.  
Mbeki’s grand foreign policy agenda contained political, social, eco-
nomic and cultural dimensions, and, in practical terms, it set out to use sta-
tecraft to progress peace, democratization, development, and nation-building 
(Van Heerden 2017). According to Van Heerden (2017, 136), under Thabo 
Mbeki, “[…] there was a shift in South Africa’s approach to international rela-
tions with regard to the region and the continent”. Van Heerden (2017, 136) 
went on to conclude that “the Mbeki administration sought to build skills and 
capacity and create a viable regional bloc, namely SADC2, which could then 
operate effectively in the modern global environment”. Van Heerden (2017, 
136) gave us a sense of Mbeki’s international strategy and reach: 
South Africa has enhanced its position in the international order to 
the extent that it remains a key player in the G77 and continues to 
be invited to the G20 summits. It is frequently requested to mediate 
crises and conflicts on the continent, with varying degrees of success, 
as is still views by many as the gateway to Africa because of its well
-established financial sector and its good infrastructure. The India, 
Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) initiative is gaining momentum and 
the South-South countries still see South Africa as a key team player 
in pushing to change the rules of the global governance game.  
Mbeki’s strategy was therefore multi-pronged and multi-faceted. 
Elsewhere we referred to Mbeki’s foreign policy of transformation, and depic-
ted it as a logical extension of domestic transformation policies: to create a 
non-racial society; end sexism in the country; create a caring society sensitive 
to the needs of the most vulnerable; promote respect for the cultural and lin-
guistic diversity in the country; poverty eradication and transformation into 
a modern, dynamic and competitive economy (Landsberg 2016, 436-448). 
At the heart of this multitudinous foreign policy was Africa; the continent 
formed the epicenter of Mbeki’s diplomacy under the banner of a continental 
African Renaissance vision, what I have dubbed elsewhere an Afro-continen-
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tal (Landsberg 2016, 436-448) strategy. What is little known is his strategies 
towards global Africa, including strategies vis-à-vis the global South; North-
South relations; and the terrain of global governance, what we would like 
to depict as a global African Renaissance strategy, all in efforts to make the 
global terrain and order more favorable to African interests. 
Towards a theory of the new Global Africa
Before zeroing in on the global African Renaissance discourse of 
Thabo Mbeki, I would like to start on a note of conceptualization and the-
orization. The theory of the new Global Africa works on the premise that 
Africa and its historical diasporas throughout the world  have entered a new 
dynamic phase and wish to move away from a dichotomy between the core 
(motherland) and periphery (diasporic communities) and embrace their his-
tories, cultures and experiences. This is in order to assert a new identity of 
global Africa that wishes to recognize their participation and management 
of their public affairs and contribute to social transformation of all African 
communities worldwide, not just those in continental Africa. Kwesi Kwaa 
Prah pleaded for “continued engagement of the youth in Africa and the 
Diaspora to issues related to the ideals of Pan-Africanism. The vitality of the 
ideal and its continued ability to move people of African descent in pursuit 
of the ideal and its continued ability to move people of African descent in 
pursuit of the goals and the idea [sic]”, he vowed, cannot be doubted (Prah 
2005, xxvii). “For a hundred years, the spirit of pan-Africanism has motivated 
and guided the thinking and action of a host of adherents” (Prah 2005, xxvii).
The major changes in the world marked by globalization in the areas 
of economic co-operation and international relations have paved the way for 
new opportunities and challenges to continental Africa and Africans in the 
diaspora. As Kwesi Prah put it, “the challenges of a globalizing world are 
many and Pan-Africanism needs to address these challenges. The platforms 
for Pan-Africanist”, advised Prah, “also need to be reconsidered” (Prah 2005, 
xxvii).  We could add that Pan-Africanism has to spread beyond the political 
platforms, the rarefied spaces of the academe, and cascade into hamlets, and 
ghettos (locations) in Africa and the diaspora to ensure that the populace 
appreciates Pan-Africanism, its ideals, and have a role to play in its advan-
cement.
Sabelo Sibanda argued that, “within the Pan-Afrikan Movement there 
have been those people who have taken the limited view that Pan-Africa-
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nism is only about uniting the people on the continent of Afrika and this 
view is mainly confined to those people actually born and/or resident on the 
continent” (Sibanda 2005, 242). Elsewhere I have referred to this as “Afro-
continentalism”. Sibanda goes further to assert that “this school of thought 
does not fully put into perspective, and thus recognize, the significance of the 
contributions of Diaspora born Afrikans to the pan-Afrikan Movement”. The 
key point to take out of Sibanda’s analysis is that “Pan-Afrikanism, without 
taking on board the fact that the presence of the Afrikan Nation is global and 
not just on the African Continent, is highly deficient and may render itself 
ineffectual and meaningless, thus null and void” (Sibanda 2005, 242). When 
he deliberately replaces “c” with “k” in Afrikan, he is driving home the point 
about the importance of indigenous language by Africans.  
Chen Chimutengwende puts it more crisply and in a more basic, 
pragmatic manner: 
Africa needs Diaspora Africans in the liberation and development pro-
cess. Diaspora Africans also need Africa as their ancestral homeland 
and global base. They need each other at the international level. The 
global base is essential to their own liberation and socio-economic 
empowerment wherever they may be residing in the world (Chimu-
tengwende  2005, 343).
It is important to bring global Africanism back in. Peoples of African 
descent in South, Central and North America, the Caribbean, the Indian 
Ocean, the Middle East, South Asia and the South Pacific are placing growing 
importance on the ties that bind them to Africa and the global Africa diaspora. 
These people of African descent wish to have their societies and experiences 
deconstructed and reconstructed. Some of these peoples and countries, nota-
bly those captured, wish to rectify the historical distortions of racism, racial 
discrimination, inequality and a history of humiliation. 
Afro-continentalism: Africa “first” Renaissance 
I could highlight here a number of legacies of Mbeki’s foreign policy 
project. But, the first and foremost legacy must be his new continental and 
global pan-Africanist project, pursued under the banner of “the African 
Renaissance” as he determinately set out to lay the foundations for the 21st 
Century to be transformed into the African Century (Pityana 2018). The key 
point to stress about the African Renaissance, is the idea of restoring Afri-
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can pride, and dignity, as well as positioning Africa abroad, while seeking 
to infuse a sense of confidence in and about Africans continentally (Pityana 
2019). Mbeki defined the African Renaissance as the need for Africans to 
determine who they are, what they stand for, what their visions and hopes are, 
how they do things, what programs they adopt, who they relate to and how. 
According to Adekeye Adebajo, “Mbeki’s foreign policy was in part 
driven by his vision of an African Renaissance, which, as well as encouraging 
South Africans to embrace an African identity, sought to promote the conti-
nent’s political, economic and social renewal, and the reintegration of Africa 
into the global economy” (Adebajo 2016, 113). Adebajo went further and 
expanded on the political project, underscoring Mbeki’s Renaissance vision 
when he said that he “[…]urged Africans to adapt democracy to fit their own 
specific conditions without compromising its principles of representation 
and accountability” (Adebajo 2016, 113). Overcoming a sense of inferiority 
on the part of Africans was a key objective and, according to Adebajo, Mbeki 
“[…] further challenged them to discover a sense of their own self-confidence 
after centuries of slavery and colonialism, which had systematically denigra-
ted  their cultures  and subjugated their institutions to alien rule” (Adebajo 
2016, 113). Significantly, Adebajo articulated one of the cardinal principles 
underscoring Mbeki’s Renaissance vision, namely autonomy and self-deter-
mination: “Mbeki’s African Renaissance had as its central goal the right of 
African people to determine their own future” (Adebajo 2016, 113).
With Mbeki’s vision of an African Renaissance, which, as well as 
encouraging South Africans to embrace an African identity, often posed the 
major challenge to his Cabinet, his people, and to fellow Africans to embrace 
the African Renaissance and ensure that there had to be a major focus on 
the need to try and defeat global poverty, underdevelopment and inequality, 
while also empowering blacks at home and Africans generally to become 
confident to challenge their positions of underdevelopment and subjugation 
in the world. 
Whereas white apartheid governments had seen South Africa as an 
extension of Europe, Mbeki set out to debunk this notion and assert South 
Africa’s African belonging. As part of Africa, and with other forces, South 
Africa championed for peace, democracy and reconstruction and develop-
ment of the Continent. Notwithstanding the call by many that South Africa 
should act as some sort of an African hegemon – the one that would lay down 
the laws to others through imposition and domination – Mbeki shunned such 
ideas and instead punted the notion of South Africa as equal partner on the 
continent and globally. Peace diplomacy, or a Pax-South Africana strategy, 
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occupied a special place in Mbeki’s foreign policy radar screen (Landsberg 
2010, 436-456). He preferred to play the role of peacemaker and peacekee-
per throughout Africa acting through multilateral institutions: the Southern 
Africa Development Community; the African Union; the UN Security Cou-
ncil. 
Mbeki is fiercely in defense of Africa’s sovereignty. He is in the fore-
front in opposing external actors’ propensity to meddle in Africa’s affairs, 
thus encroaching on its sovereignty and perpetuating the legacy of humi-
liation against Africa. Mbeki has issues with international criminal justice 
as dispensed by the International Criminal Court (ICC), that he accuses of 
disregarding Africa’s search for homegrown solutions in its quest to resolve 
its conflicts. He opposed the UNSC’s decision to indict Sudanese president 
Omar al-Bashir for egregious crimes in Sudan’s Darfur region first in March 
2009, then July 2010, while peaceful efforts were ongoing to address the 
crisis. He has also been critical of the invasion of Libya by North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) thus accelerating its ruination. 
This led to Mbeki and his allies pushing agency and voice, resulting 
in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) – a modernization 
development plan, making a link between democracy and governance on the 
one hand, and peace and security on the other (Landsberg 2017, 195-212). 
They would not allow foreign powers to dictate to them what development 
program would look like and prescribe. They had no desire to return to the 
dark days of the Washington Consensus and Structural Adjustment Programs 
and devised NEPAD, which committed African leaders to pledge themselves 
to transforming their states into democratic developmental states (Mbeki 
2012, 3). NEPAD’s primary objectives were “to accelerate the eradication of 
poverty in Africa and inequality between Africa and the developed world”, 
and to “place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path 
of sustainable growth and development” (Landsberg 2008). “Leaders were 
determined to halt the marginalization of Africa in the globalization pro-
cess; and accelerate the empowerment of women” (Landsberg 2008). With 
NEPAD, Mbeki and his allies pursued a “developmental ideology, which 
makes the link between development, democratic governance, peace and 
security, and economic growth”. 
Mbeki was the chief architect of the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM), a governance promotion tool which did not rely on punitive mea-
sures to promote governance, and singled out democracy, political gover-
nance, socio-economic development, economic governance, management 
and corporate governance (APRM, 2007). The APRM adopted a number of 
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principles in defense of African autonomy and self-determination, including 
(APRM, 2007):  African ownership and leadership; anchoring the develop-
ment of the continent on the resourcefulness of the African people, and lessen 
depending on external largesse; accelerating and deepening of regional and 
continental integration; creating conditions that make the African countries 
referred destinations by foreign investors; a new partnership among Africans 
and the international community, especially the industrialized world; and 
a comprehensive, holistic and integrated development program for Africa.
This mechanism involved governments, civil society organizations, 
business organizations, members of communities and families to reflect 
jointly on the achievements and challenges of their respective polities. With 
the APRM initiative and others, Mbeki was driven by the vision of the right 
of the people to participate in processes of democratic governance (Mbeki 
2012, 3). Africans, he implored, must serve as “their own liberators” (Mbeki 
2012, 3).
Indeed, he was key to South Africa becoming the host for the NEPAD 
and APRM secretariats, and Mbeki was not shy to insist that South Africa 
should pay for these institutions.  Mbeki showed agency and put his money 
where his mouth was on these noble continental initiatives that somewhat 
lost their steam after Mbeki left office in 2008. Mbeki’s strong and even 
idiosyncratic style of leadership in pursuit of the African Renaissance vision 
was also the flipside of these initiatives. Once out of power, no other Afri-
can leader could champion the entrenchment of these structures in Africa’s 
governance architecture with as much enthusiasm.
By the time of Mbeki’s abrupt removal from office in September 
2008, South Africa boasted a diplomatic presence in 47 of the continent’s sta-
tes, more than any other nation of the world, positioning itself to be influen-
tial in Africa and elsewhere. As part of this ‘Africa first’ policy, Mbeki was 
key to the founding of the African Union. How ironic that the country that 
never had the privilege of joining the Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
because of its pursuit of an obnoxious, racist policy of apartheid, would come 
to be the first African state to Chair the successor African Union, and even 
have the privilege of launching  the continent’s foremost pan-continental 
body (Landsberg 2006). Indeed, during the launch of the AU in July 2002, 
in Durban, South Africa, Mbeki articulated his vision of a continental func-
tionalist project and an architecture based on states living with common 
institutions, norms and values, and a rules based common order, not that of 
Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi who favored a federalist supra-nationalist United 
States of Africa (USAf).
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Under the Mbeki functionalist approach there were five sub-regions, 
and a sixth extending to the African diaspora. 
In terms of Pax-South Africana, only one year into his presidency, 
South Africa established the $30 million African Renaissance and Co-ope-
ration Fund (ARF) to promote democracy, development and cooperation, by 
granting loans and financial assistance to other African countries, putting 
South Africa at the table with other donor nations; Mbeki wanted to show 
others that he puts his money where his mouth is and is not one who relies 
too much on the largesse of western states (Adebajo 2016, 118).  With the 
ARF, Mbeki showed that he was willing to commit funds to secure Africa and 
supported peace initiatives in Burundi; in the Comoros, as OAU mandated 
coordinator; in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); facilitated dialogue 
with Lesotho and Angola; helped train observes for peace processes in Ethio-
pia and Eritrea; provided logistical support for the peace process in Sierra 
Leone; supported UN-led processes in Western Sahara; provided support for 
IGAD peace processes in Somalia; and provided assistance for demining. 
Towards a Global Africa Renaissance – The Diaspora
On 30 June 2003, President Thabo Mbeki delivered one of the most 
important, yet under-reported and under-estimated speeches at the Univer-
sity of the West Indies in Kingston, Jamaica.  This speech spoke directly to 
Global Africa as Mbeki spoke of “the African Diaspora in the 21st Century” 
and located this speech within the context of the “bold” speak of an “African 
Renaissance” and the “need for us to ensure that the 21st Century becomes 
an African century” (Mbeki 2003).
Mbeki invoked something akin to the global African Renaissance 
when he said how vital it was “to talk about what we might do together to 
achieve those goals, understanding that when we speak of an African Renais-
sance, we speak of the rebirth that must encompass all Africans, both in 
Africa and in the African diaspora” (Mbeki 2003).
Global Africa has to respond to the realities of global geoeconomics 
and geopolitics, in which it plays a marginal role. When he interpreted the 
world in the 2003 speech, he asserted that “Africans on the continent and 
in the Diaspora are today confronted by a world of financial, investment and 
trade regimes which unfairly favor the developed world and which prevents 
them from improving their quality of life” (Mbeki 2003).  Africans on the 
continent and in the diaspora should have no illusion that “skewed invest-
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ment patterns, unfair trading systems and gross imbalances in terms of 
access to production of capital continue to undermine development efforts 
in the African and developing world” (Mbeki 2003). 
While he was confident that Africa could claim the 21st Century as 
its own, he had no illusion about the challenge at hand: he reminded us that 
Africans in both the Diaspora and the continent have entered the 21st 
century still confronted by the hard realities of entrenched poverty, 
general underdevelopment, death from curable diseases, illiteracy, 
international marginalization and little prospects of rates of growth 
and development that will close the gap between themselves and the 
rich countries (Mbeki 2003).
Unity amongst Africans is an overriding theme that runs through the 
works of Thabo Mbeki. He noted that these founding fathers, the Pan-African 
pantheons, highlight the importance of unity “even as they had traversed 
the seas” and “born of the realization that as one people with one history we 
are bound by the same future” (Mbeki 2003). With this statement, Mbeki 
transcended old motherland-periphery understandings of the diaspora and 
embraced a true Global African outlook. On this score, and drawing a link 
between past and future, he bemoaned the fact that, “long after the demise 
of slavery and colonialism, the lives of Africans and their dependents are still 
blighted by a plethora of challenges not unrelated to the past whose imprints 
the present bears” (Mbeki 2003).
We all know that as members of the global African family, we share a 
history of oppression and humiliation, and Mbeki was correct in the Jamaican 
speech to assert that, “shared oppression in the United States, the Caribbean, 
and Africa at the end of the 19th Century, took some of the foremost thinkers 
and activists for the emancipation of Africans everywhere to London to par-
ticipate in the 1st pan-African Congress” (Mbeki 2003). 
Mbeki reminds us indeed that it was the year 1900 when the Trini-
dadian barrister Henry Sylvester Williams initiated the first pan-African Con-
gress in London. Mbeki drew a link between late-19th and early-20th Century 
pan-Africanisms and the variant of the early-21st Century derivants, when he 
said that the 1900 conference was seminal to the political and philosophical 
movement of pan-Africanism throughout the world, the catalyst that has 
ultimately led to the formation of the African Union at the beginning of the 
21st Century.
In 2000, Mbeki went to Bahia, Brazil, to receive an honorary docto-
rate from a local university, located in an area in which most of the inhabi-
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tants are offspring of slaves from Africa (Adebajo 2016, 119). He insisted in 
addressing the local inhabitants and no other African leader has taken the 
hereditary link between Brazil and Africa more seriously than Mbeki. Adebajo 
reminds us that Mbeki read “from a poignant poem, ‘The Slave Ship’, by 
the Brazilian poet Castro Alves, he told the audience: ‘Brazil cannot achieve 
its full identity unless it celebrates, also, its historical and cultural connec-
tion with Africa, before calling for the development of more Afro-Brazilian 
scientists, economist and businesspeople” (Adebajo 2016, 119). By doing so, 
he broke ranks with diplomatic protocol and niceties and raced squarely the 
race issue in Brazil.
Most engagements between Brazil and African countries are com-
mercial, but not located with the global African milieu. Mbeki made a point 
of stressing this ancestral link.
In January 2004, Mbeki was the only African leader to attend Hai-
ti’s bicentenary celebrations of its slave revolt against France. Haiti was the 
first black state to attain independence, it symbolizes the yoke of servitude 
that most African countries still suffer from long after independence and 
continued being indebted to France for years, a situation that contributed to 
its underdevelopment. There are parallels between Haiti’s plight and capital 
flight, illicit financial flows from Africa, and some of the impoverishing agre-
ements that France has with its former colonies in Africa. Among African 
leaders, only Mbeki took notice of the significance of Haiti’s bicentenary 
celebrations to the rest of the global African vision.
On the responsibilities of the African Intelligentsia
For Mbeki, the African intelligentsia always had a major responsibi-
lity to help with the unity and renaissance of Africa. In that speech in Jamaica 
on 30 June 2003, Mbeki asserted that “the African universities, both in Africa 
and the diaspora, have a responsibility both to understand the world and 
to interpret it” (Mbeki 2003). “What we must be about”, argued Mbeki, “is 
changing the conditions that for many centuries have imposed on Africans 
everywhere the status of underlings” (Mbeki 2003). He was emphatic that 
“the African condition does not permit an African intelligentsia that merely 
interprets the world, while doing nothing to change it” (Mbeki 2003).
In terms of Global Africa, Mbeki observed that, whereas Du Bois 
defined the problem of the 20th Century as that of the color-line,
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[...] perhaps the time has come for the African intelligentsia in the 
Americas, the Caribbean, Europe and Africa to come together again, 
this time to make the statement – the problem of the 21st Century is 
the problem of poverty, underdevelopment and marginalization – and 
together search for ways and means by which to confront this pro-
blem (Mbeki, 2003).
 Few African leaders have shown as much appreciation for the role 
of memory and ideational power. As part of Mbeki’s diaspora reach, Mbeki 
carried out certain high profile intellectual initiatives in commemoration of 
African memory, remembrance and retention.
Mbeki spearheaded the preservation of the Timbuktu manuscripts at 
Ahmed Baba Research Institute in Mali, following his visit to the country in 
2001. He set up a trust fund and assembled a team of South Africa experts to 
train and help their Malian counterparts to preserve this invaluable African 
heritage and contribution to African epistemology and intellectual heritage. 
Initially, the South African government donated R30 million while the private 
sector donated R32 million to the fund. Although many were religious Islamic 
texts, the manuscripts contained details on mathematics, political history, 
astronomy, and natural sciences. Mbeki highlighted Africa’s as the cradle of 
epistemology and debunked the myth that it is historically a tabula rasa. It 
is a producer rather than a consumer of knowledge per se, is the argument 
he made through this initiative.
In April 2017, Mbeki received an honorary doctorate from a Kenyan 
university, Dedan Kimathi University of Science and Technology, named 
after one of the country’s leaders during the Mau Mau rebellion against the 
British rule. Even out of office, Mbeki still celebrates gallant individuals who 
have fought for the restoration of Africans’ dignity and pride on the continent 
and in the diaspora.
Global African Renaissance: Enhancing South-South coo-
peration, North-South dialogue and Global governance 
Strategies towards continental and global Africa were not the only 
ones that featured prominently in the Mbeki foreign agenda and grand policy 
schemes; building ties between Africa and countries from the global South, 
and developing countries in general, was just as important in Mbeki’s foreign 
policy. In this sense, one could argue that Mbeki was a proponent of what 
I would call a South-South African Renaissance strategy (Landsberg 2000, 
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75-81).  The emphasis on the need for South-South cooperation was born 
out of the struggle against apartheid and colonial rule, and the fact that the 
liberation movements benefited immensely from the solidarism of the cou-
ntries of the South.
During the Mbeki presidency, South Africa pushed above its weight 
and commanded an influence in world affairs usually reserved for super 
powers. Moving beyond a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ between North and South, 
Mbeki advocated that development had to be seen as a universal and strategic 
challenge, and that there needed to be change in the international balance 
of power and significant financial resources should be committed from the 
North, so as to bolster Africa’s development prospects. As part of his global 
African Renaissance strategy, Thabo Mbeki almost single handedly put the 
question of a new relationship between North and South on the agenda, 
moving away from a paternalistic relationship to a new policy, development 
and intellectual paradigm of a genuine partnership (Mbeki 1998). 
His government emphasized that a heavy burden rested on the shoul-
ders of the formally colonized, and that the developing world had legitimate 
claims for compensation from the West. Just as Europe and Germany received 
a massive injection of capital after World War Two, so should Africa, in order 
to achieve its development objectives. Mbeki was instrumental with Nigeria 
and Algeria in negotiating a strategic partnership between Africa and the G-8, 
jointly among governments with the private sector and other organs of civil 
society, which led to numerous North-South commitments in areas of health, 
innovation and knowledge, through science and technology, infrastructure, 
trade and investment, increased official development assistance, debt relief, 
private sector growth, agriculture and food security and education; this part-
nership was to be based on mutual respect, responsibility and accountability. 
As Uber diplomat and Pan-African statesman, Mbeki also espoused 
global governance strategies that sought to transform the global order in ways 
that would give Africa, and states from the global south, a voice and greater 
agency in world affairs. Mbeki was no timid statesman. He was courageous 
enough to devise policies, in partnership with fellow African leaders and 
leaders from the South, that set out to give answers to the irreversible process 
of globalization in a manner that would respond to the challenges of poverty, 
inequality and exclusion, which confronted Africans and peoples from the 
broader “Third World”. 
Mbeki, almost single handedly, put onto the global agenda the idea 
of a strategic partnership between Africa and the international community, 
based on the principles of mutual accountability and mutual responsibility. 
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For Mbeki, the fundamental challenges flowing from the irreversible 
process of globalization included poverty, underdevelopment, the growing 
North-South gap, racism and xenophobia, gender discrimination, ill health, 
violent conflicts and a threat to the environment (DFA 2000). The spoils of 
globalization needed to be shared more widely and he was committed to the 
dismantling of barriers of trade for the mutual benefit of all (DFA 2000). 
Mbeki advocated for improved market access for the exports of all coun-
tries, most notably African and other developing countries, and supported a 
trade regime that would enable developing countries to build up skills and 
manufacturing capacities, while enhancing growth and achieving prosperity 
(DFA 2000). 
The criticism we could cite is that owing to his commitment to the 
global African agenda, he lost touch with the domestic politics in South 
Africa that contributed to his premature exit from power.  He seemed to 
have become oblivious of the nexus between domestic politics and foreign 
policy and exclusively concentrated his time and energy to the cause of global 
African Renaissance to the detriment of his legacy at home.
Conclusion
I conclude with an intriguing question: could it be that the man who 
grew up  struggling from childhood, who played a pivotal part as a central 
figure in the world’s oldest, and one of its most successful, liberation move-
ments for 52 years, was called a ruthless decision-maker, and even labelled an 
AIDS-denialist, has undeniably positioned himself as a dovish super diplo-
mat, came to dominate politics in his country, and diplomacy in his continent, 
for the entire first decade of the 21st Century, will come to play a more vital role 
in rebuilding continental and diasporic African communities, by promoting 
a global African Renaissance for the revival of Global Africanness now that 
he is freed from the strictures of formal presidential politics? Will Africa’s 
foremost global Pan-African leader of the early 21st Century come to play a 
more fundamental role in helping not just continental, but global Africa to 
claim this 21st Century as the Global African century? Well, he has continued 
energetically with active promotion of the global Renaissance project after 
Presidency. I for one would not put this past Thabo Mbeki, the global African 
Renaissance man.
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Abstract
Thabo Mbeki is a global Pan-African in his own right, and one of the foremost 
Pan-African thought leaders of his generation. The man who was called sensitive, 
ruthless and hard-nosed, has left a distinct mark in pan-African discourse, both 
during and after his tenure as the second democratically elected president of South 
Africa. This strategist and tactician, who espoused a transformational and visionary 
leadership style, has earned his stripes, in part, by making a unique contribution 
to Pan-Africanism and is indeed among Pan-Africa’s Pantheons. He pursued an 
African Renaissance as a vision and a strategy aimed at the Africana world broadly 
– a Global Africa strategy.  As one of the Pan-African pantheons – heroes – he has 
made major contributions not just to Afro-continentalism, but also to Global Africa, 
in other words to continental Africa and the diaspora.
Keywords
Thabo Mbeki; Global Africa; Global African Renaissance; Africa Claiming the 21st 
Century; South-South cooperation; North-South dialogue.
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